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Long run 
October is a good month for 
marathon runners, as training 
schedules and weather conditions 
normally reach an optimal point of 
equilibrium. This may help explain 
the summit marathon the EU went 
through over the past few days, 
including two European Council and 
two “Euro” Council meetings in 
four days – and one night. 
Still, the race is not over: fixing the 
euro zone crisis and laying new 
foundations for its economic 
governance will require additional 
efforts, more time, better tactics and, 
above all, a clear and agreed strategy. 
Many elements have been added to 
the equation now, but some need to 
be better quantified and then 
couched in a comprehensive, 
convincing, feasible package. 
Substantial progress has been made 
thanks also to the brinkmanship and 
dramatisation of the past weeks. 
Perhaps most importantly, now 
everyone (inside as well as outside 
Europe) realises that the euro 
project is “too big to fail”. Yet much 
remains to be done, discussed and 
decided in what increasingly looks 
like a reform process for the long 
run rather than a one-off quick fix. 
In fact, the Union looks torn 
between velocity, legitimacy and 
technicality. Crisis management 
requires quick (re-)action and an 
ability to play poker – the least 
transparent of games – rather than 
bridge  or canasta, with their 
declarations and contractual rules. 
Yet the policy choices that need to 
be made now cannot be finalised 
without a political mandate and a 
public discussion, which, in turn, 
may slow down or even block the 
process (as we have seen also 
recently). Finally, the issues at stake 
are very technical in nature and 
entail a high level of expertise: this, 
in turn, risks antagonising citizens 
who feel marginalised or even 
harassed. 
In the long run, this tangled web of 
contrasting requirements needs to be 
unravelled – bit by bit but also in its 
entirety (and this issue of BEPA 
Monthly Brief tries to contribute to 
this by highlighting some of what 
remains to be done, both internally 
and externally). 
This is also why the October 
marathon is not going to be the last 
for the EU. It is rather likely to be a 
much longer race, run in stages of 
varying length and difficulty – a bit 
like la Grande Boucle, but hopefully 
crowned with a Grand Slam. 
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1 How to prevent, contain and resolve crises 
By Sony Kapoor 
The current euro crisis is multifaceted as it has 
financial, economic and political dimensions 
which have amplified one another – so much so 
that the EU, the euro area in particular, is now 
facing the biggest challenge in its history. To 
emerge from it stronger, Europe needs a two-
pronged approach that combines short-term 
actions to stem the prevailing panic, and a 
medium-term blueprint to correct the structural, 
regulatory and governance problems that allowed 
the crisis to grow in the first place. 
Without first stemming the crisis in the short 
term, the EU will not get the financial and 
economic space needed to make the necessary 
longer term structural changes. At the same time, 
without the EU first presenting a credible 
roadmap for where the European project is 
headed, it is unlikely that market confidence be 
restored in the short term. That is why action is 
needed on both fronts simultaneously. 
Stemming the short-term panic 
In order to restore confidence, a series of short-
term measures is needed. These involve actions on: 
• finance: recapitalising the financial system and 
temporarily increasing funding support for 
banks; 
• economy: providing illiquid but solvent 
sovereigns (such as Spain and Italy) with 
funding support and pan-EU measures to 
stimulate growth;  
• governance: creating and improving crisis 
response mechanisms.  
Some progress is palpable in the measures 
announced this month by the European Council 
but they do not go far enough. Banks will be 
recapitalised but not enough. Agreement on 
supporting longer-term borrowing by banks 
excessively reliant on temporary funding from 
the ECB remains thin on details. Arguably, 
instituting a moratorium on bonuses and 
dividend pay-outs till enough capital has been 
built up in the European banking system would 
significantly enhance the effectiveness of 
measures to restore confidence in EU banks and, 
at the same time, minimise any burden on the 
public purse.  
Sovereigns are being supported by the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) but even with 
the agreement to expand its effective size 
through leverage such large countries as Spain 
and Italy would require additional support. While 
effective for helping small peripheral economies, 
the EFSF is not appropriate for supporting large 
core economies. The ECB, which is only 
reluctantly backing troubled economies through 
interventions in the bond markets will eventually 
need to ramp up those interventions. Without 
that, full confidence cannot be restored. 
Without new growth the indebtedness problem 
that is affecting both banks and sovereigns is 
only likely to get worse. The current plans to 
kick-start growth are inadequate and need to be 
expanded and broadened. In particular, the 
callable capital of the European Investment 
Bank could be doubled in order to initiate an 
ambitious program of building trans-EU 
infrastructure in the power, broadband and 
transport sectors. 
The timelines for Member States to meet deficit 
targets will probably need to be extended. While 
these may have been appropriate at a time when 
economic troubles were limited to a few small 
countries, they are too rigid now that the whole 
of the EU (not to mention other large world 
economies) is seeing a big economic slowdown. 
This also means that some Member States – 
particularly those that still have some spare fiscal 
capacity – may actually need to expand rather 
than cut back on public spending. Austerity may 
make sense individually but, if applied 
collectively to an economy the size of the EU, it 
will inevitably have a negative impact on growth. 
It is now clear that EU institutions were designed 
for peace time, not crisis. Although it was set up 
specifically for crisis management, however, the 
EFSF also suffers from serious limitations. At 
*Sony Kapoor is Managing Director of Re-Define, and a Visitor at BEPA. 
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present, the speed and effectiveness of the EFSF’s 
(and its successor ESM’s) response is limited, first, 
by a decision-making process that requires all EU-
17 to agree on any major decision and, second, by 
the scarce number of instruments it has at its 
disposal. It needs to shift to qualified majority 
decision-making at least for urgent decisions, and 
to significantly expand its toolkit to be able, for 
example, to recapitalise weak banks in weak 
countries directly, i.e. without first lending to the 
sovereign. It will also need to provide temporary 
bond guarantees to banks to restore their access 
to funding markets. Asking banks to guarantee 
lending to the real economy in exchange for 
capital and funding support is a good way of 
preventing a credit crunch. 
None of the actions discussed above would be 
credible without being backed by the political 
will of Member States. Indeed a less fractious 
political approach, whereby a unified stance is 
jointly communicated to the markets, would be 
far more effective. 
Making structural changes in the medium-
term 
In order to tackle the problems posed by the 
financial sector the EU needs to institute a strong 
crisis management framework for financial 
institutions. This will enact legislation allowing 
troubled banks to be shut down without drawing 
on taxpayer funds. Provisions such as being able 
to automatically apply haircuts to bondholders 
would be required as well as mechanisms to 
simplify the notoriously complex structures of 
banks and financial institutions – so they can be 
taken over (or wound down) quickly. If 
implemented rigorously, such legislation would 
prevent banks from bringing sovereigns to their 
knees – as they did in Ireland and Iceland. 
At the same time, reforms are also needed to 
make sure that weak sovereigns don’t weigh their 
banks down – as they have done in Greece and, 
to a lesser extent, in Spain and Italy. 
Traditionally, banks hold substantial amounts of 
bonds of the countries they are located in, which 
makes them susceptible to any deterioration in 
the fiscal situation of the country. If the EU ever 
moves towards Eurobonds, one of their biggest 
(and least mentioned) advantages would be that 
they would be an excellent substitute for these 
sovereign bonds. Another way of doing this (and 
one that would not require Eurobonds) would 
be to institute a limit on exposures to the debts 
of any single sovereign. 
To make sure that fiscal sustainability is restored 
additional action is needed on two fronts: 
increasing growth and cutting deficits. To these 
ends, structural reforms that cut red-tape, boost 
infrastructure and green investments and 
enhance the functioning of the single market 
would be needed. 
Cooperating at EU level on the ad hoc measures 
taken so far by individual countries against tax 
evasion could help bring substantial new 
revenues to Member States, thus reducing the 
need for extensive expenditure cuts of the kind 
that harm investments or reduce support for the 
poor. Increasing taxes on the financial sector 
(through levies on short-term funds for banks 
and/or a financial transaction tax) can both be a 
new source of substantial revenue and improve 
the functioning of markets. And increasing 
taxation on carbon emissions would help the EU 
regain its lead on establishing a green economy 
suited to the 21st century. 
The EU will also need to make a decision on 
what governance reforms it would like to enact. 
The “six-pack” reforms that have just been 
adopted move in the right direction but will not 
be enough. By increasing the intrusiveness and 
scope of surveillance of national economies, it 
takes into account that whatever each Member 
State does now has an increasing impact on its 
neighbours. Surveillance, however, will only 
work if backed up with strong and credible 
sanctions, which need to be strengthened. 
We will additionally need to hard-wire a lender 
of last resort function for the European Central 
Bank, so it can reliably backstop troubled EU 
banks and sovereigns if they face temporary 
liquidity problems. 
Finally, a credible way – possibly involving 
variable reserve requirements levied by the ECB 
and countercyclical capital buffers implemented 
by Member States – needs to be found to 
minimise the possibility of instability generating 
negative real interest rates in the faster growing 
EU economies. 
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The issue of Europe’s global competitiveness is 
not new – at least not since the publication of 
Jacques Delors’ White Paper on a medium-term 
strategy for growth, competitiveness and 
employment in 1993. Interestingly, the related 
key words have been extraordinarily constant 
ever since. Policy has been (and still is) focused 
firstly on innovation and then on structural 
reforms: namely, more flexible labour markets, 
the lowering of trade barriers to gain access to 
third markets and cheap imports, and the 
harnessing of globalisation in a context of fair 
rules. But the acceleration of the globalisation 
process justifies taking a new and fresh look at 
Europe’s overall competitiveness.  
The good news 
To start with, the EU does have a positive story 
to tell regarding the overall performance of its 
economy on the global stage, one that is better 
than most “doom and gloom” stories reported in 
the media. The EU still derives major benefits 
from openness: it remains a major global player 
in trade, in particular for high-tech and high-
quality goods, with a €207 billion surplus in 
manufacturing in 2010 [all EU figures from 
Eurostat].  
The EU is also the world’s biggest exporter of 
commercial services, with a 24.9% market share. 
It is both the largest provider and the biggest 
recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows. Overall, EU companies invest more 
abroad than foreign companies do in the EU. 
The Union also possesses by far the biggest 
share (€3.6 trillion in 2010), and is the biggest 
host (€2.7 trillion) of foreign assets.  
Moreover, open trade has boosted 
EU productivity and increased its external 
competitiveness. In 2010, one third of 
EU growth was a result of its trade performance; 
20 % of technological innovation was linked to 
such openness. In 2010 one-third of EU growth 
came from trade. As of today, 35% of EU jobs 
are linked to foreign companies and 7.2% of EU 
jobs depend on exports, while 18% (i.e. 
36 million jobs) depend on trade more broadly. 
With 90% of global growth expected to come 
from outside the EU in the coming decade, trade 
will be increasingly central to the EU’s future 
success.  
It is evident, however, that the competitiveness 
agenda is now set by the rapid growth and 
industrial development of the emerging 
economies. China is the fastest growing one (and 
the EU’s second biggest market), and it will 
represent 30% of future growth. The complexity 
of its pattern of production and allocation of 
resources has continued to increase, linked as it 
is to domestic factors (internal market, labour 
market, R&D, optimisation of chain of 
production within the EU-27), sector-specific 
constraints and regional strategies – e.g. in East 
Asia, South Korea, Japan, and China itself. 
New trends are also becoming apparent. First, 
emerging economies are diversifying and 
upgrading their production capacity and 
extending to services and FDI: China, to name 
one, is turning into a high-tech exporter and has 
started to provide construction services and to 
develop its own FDI in Europe. Second, 
industrial performance is becoming more closely 
linked to a combination of access to goods, 
services and FDI: industry needs to have access 
to cheap intermediate goods, to efficient 
telecommunication, financial or distribution 
services, and to technology brought by FDIs.  
On top of this, the chain of production is 
increasingly segmented both within the EU and 
worldwide: today, two thirds of EU imports are 
intermediate products, and part of the final 
production is re-exported. Yet developed 
countries, and in particular the EU, still control 
most of the high added value segments of 
production: R&D, marketing and distribution for 
example. The most famous example is the 
iPhone: its production chain is localised in 
9 countries, including China, Japan, the US and 
Germany. Chinese added value, however, 
2 Mapping EU external competitiveness 
By Eric Peters* 
* Eric Peters is an Adviser in the Analyis Team in BEPA. 
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represents only 3.6% of production (2006) and, 
despite being manufactured in China, the iPhone 
generated 14 000 jobs and $750 million in the US, 
compared to $320 million abroad. In this model, 
competitiveness is based as much on capacity to 
import at a low price as on access to foreign 
markets in which to sell the final product.  
Finally, the rise of China is a unique feature of 
economic history. It is clearly the challenge for 
Europe and the rest of the world – both a huge 
opportunity and a problem for ensuring the 
enforcement of fair rules. 
New challenges, new responses 
The EU is in the process of gradually adapting to 
globalisation. Candide’s “tout est pour le mieux dans 
le meilleur des mondes possibles”, however, should 
not apply here. Restructuring of the less 
competitive sectors still has painful 
consequences in terms of unemployment, 
especially in some areas. And a series of factors 
and issues is creating distortions that prevent the 
EU’s industry from reaping the full benefits of 
globalisation in terms of growth and jobs. 
First, and as a general point, the global rules-
based system and agenda are no longer 
completely in line with EU interests. Long gone 
is the time when the EU could shape the rules-
based system it needed to influence globalisation 
(as it did, for example, when the WTO was set 
up), protect intellectual property or avoid 
dumping. This trend is clearly illustrated by the 
crisis or stalemate in major multilateral 
negotiations such as Doha or climate change. 
The EU needs to adapt its strategy and develop a 
positive agenda for reshaping and reinforcing the 
multilateral system to respond to its long-term 
interests and citizens’ concerns. 
Second, concerns regarding unfair practices are 
growing – most notably in five key areas:  
1. anti-subsidies and anti-competitiveness 
practices, which are distorting competition in 
a much more harmful way than dumping: 
these enable emerging countries to unduly 
capture dominant positions in some key 
sectors (e.g. China with solar/wind energy);  
2. currency manipulation, which artificially 
boosts the competitiveness of some key 
economies (e.g. the Chinese renminbi);  
3. protection of intellectual property, often 
inadequate to shield EU industry against 
counterfeiting, industrial espionage, 
technology “hi-jacking” and so on;  
4. lack of access to public procurement tenders 
in the US, Japan, and most emerging 
countries (only 3% of the US public 
procurement market is in fact open to foreign 
bidders.);  
5. growing security concerns in the energy 
sector, especially regarding essential supplies, 
the transfer of sensitive technologies and the 
defence sector.  
Relevant policy proposals will be drafted by the 
Commission in the coming weeks. Yet some 
general conclusions can already be drawn from 
this analysis: 
• The EU must keep a strong focus on its 
strategic interests and find the right balance 
between its growing dependence on external 
markets and its equally increasing willingness 
to ring-fence negative externalities; 
• The EU should make better use of its 
influence and develop into a “smart” power 
to defend its strategic assets on the global 
stage with a view to ensuring fair trading rules 
and a rules-based multi-lateral system, 
• The EU should seek growth where it is: this is 
critical for maintaining and strengthening the 
EU’s position in high-end and high-tech 
markets and services, providing better access 
for FDI in emerging economies, and 
remaining an attractive place for incoming 
FDI; 
• At macroeconomic level, the EU needs to 
continue to address global imbalances and 
exchange rate misalignment at the IMF and 
G-20, while arguably being more open to 
considering a gradual rebalancing of formal 
shares in international financial institutions; 
• More generally, the EU need to develop a 
more pro- and re-active and better informed 
policy-making process, namely one better 
adapted to the rapid evolution of market 
conditions and more in tune with European 
business needs. 
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3 Debating the next MFF 
By Vasco Cal* 
* Vasco Cal is an Adviser in the Analyis Team in BEPA. 
For the first time ever, a conference held on 20-
21 October in Brussels on the Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2014-2020 brought 
together members of the European Parliament, 
the General Affairs Council, national Parliaments 
and the Commission. It was prepared by an 
inter-institutional group that encompassed the 
trio Presidency (Poland, Denmark and Cyprus), 
the European Parliament (President Buzek’s 
cabinet), national Parliaments (the COSAC 
Secretariat) and the Commission (BEPA, in 
cooperation with other DGs). 
Through its first session – which was open to 
civil society, non-governmental organisations 
and other relevant stakeholders – the event 
provided the representatives of the different 
institutions with an overview of the added value 
and real life impact of projects financed by the 
EU budget. Three Presidents addressed the 
Conference, namely José Manuel Barroso, Jerzy 
Buzek and the Polish Prime Minister and 
President of the EU Council Donald Tusk. 
In his opening speech, President Barroso called 
on the forthcoming European Council to take 
decisive and immediate action on all aspects of 
the roadmap presented by the Commission. He 
stressed that the EU cannot solve this crisis 
without sowing the seeds for sustainable and job-
creating growth and emphasised that investments 
at European level can make an important 
contribution to that, in particular in an austerity 
context. He called for new ways of financing the 
EU budget, namely through new own resources 
such as the Financial Transaction Tax. And he 
made it clear that the EU budget is not “money 
for Brussels” but for young people and 
researchers, calling on the participants to make 
the case for Europe and not give in to populism.  
President Buzek stressed that the original idea of 
the conference came from the European 
Parliament and mentioned its contribution to the 
Commission proposals, which he considered fair 
and transparent. After all, the EU budget is 
lower than 20 years ago and the 5% increase 
proposed by the Commission is very moderate.  
Prime Minister Tusk, for his part, qualified the 
conference as a unique event. The eventual 
decisions about the EU budget will be a direct 
manifestation of our ambitions and will affect 
every European. The Commission proposals on 
own resources may appear controversial but, if 
adequately supported, may end up being 
successful. If not, the budget will be downsized, 
and so will Europe’s overall influence. PM Tusk 
also praised Poland’s performance with spending 
EU funds and considered this the best 
protection against the crisis. 
The discussion 
The added value of the EU budget in different 
policy areas and programmes – regions, 
agriculture, Erasmus, research and innovation, 
equality of chances, also a pilot project concerning 
victims of torture – was then highlighted by 
stakeholders and recipients alike. Some Ministers 
and members of the Council – i.a. from Lithuania, 
Latvia, Italy – also took the floor and contributed 
to the debate. And dedicated sessions reserved to 
institutional players – notably on EU revenue, 
expenditure and “adding value” – offered an 
opportunity to start building a common 
understanding of the Commission proposals, 
which had been prepared (as Commissioner 
Janusz Lewandowski pointed out) in a very 
difficult context.  
The session on revenue discussed how to ensure 
better equality among Member States; the 
financial autonomy of the budget; the proposed 
new VAT resource; and the Financial 
Transactions Tax. Commissioner Algirdas 
Šemeta argued that the current financing system 
is opaque and very complex: with the exception 
of the traditional “own” resources (customs 
duties and agricultural levies), the Union’s 
sources of revenue have no link to its policy 
objectives. Moreover, many Member States find 
the existing system unfair either because of their 
limited capacity to pay or because they compare 
themselves with other contributors. Even 
correction mechanisms are perceived as a source 
of unequal treatment. In other words, the current 
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financing system risks undermining both 
solidarity and fairness. 
On top of that, national budgets and the EU 
budget compete for the same tax revenues: the way 
the EU budget is financed (with Member States 
contributions to the EU seen by many politicians 
as mere expenditure in the national balance sheet) 
inevitably creates tensions that poison the debate. 
The financing reform proposals tackle three main 
elements: the simplification of Member States 
contributions; the introduction of new own 
resources; and the reform of current correction 
mechanisms. Taken together, these proposals 
constitute a balanced package and one to be taken 
as a whole for the final decision. 
As for the session on expenditure, the discussion 
was centred on how to invest – well beyond the 
present crisis – to meet the Europe 2020 
objectives. The debate was mainly focused on 
cohesion policy and macro-economic 
conditionality and addressed the tricky 
relationship between national budgets and the 
EU budget with a view to generating added 
value. Most contributions to the Europe 2020 
strategy, in fact, are financed by national budgets: 
better synergy may create savings at national 
level and more efficient use of public money. 
For its part, the “adding value” session discussed all 
this in more detail, linking the debate to the 
European Semester and the current crisis. The 
main themes included the principle of subsidiarity 
(as related also to the concept of added value); 
fiscal consolidation and the need for growth-
enhancing measures; the ceiling for cohesion funds 
and the allocation criteria among countries; and the 
way in which these issues could and should be 
communicated to the citizens – especially at a time 
when the European project enjoys less credibility 
but is more needed than ever. 
The end of the beginning 
In his closing remarks on behalf of the college, 
Commissioner Maros Sefcovic reiterated the 
firm desire to widen the discussion on the next 
MFF as much as possible. This entails the full 
participation of citizens and their representatives 
at both national and European levels as well as 
the full engagement of all EU institutions. He 
also highlighted the main points of convergence 
achieved at the conference, namely: 
• the need to maximise added-value through a 
clear link between the resources made available 
and an agreed political strategy (Europe 2020); 
• the need to focus on what is best done – and 
done best – at EU level: the single market and 
investment in infrastructure and research, to start 
with; 
• the need to further simplify spending 
procedures and to make the life of users 
much easier, while acknowledging that this is 
a shared responsibility between the European 
and the national level; 
• the need to have a more flexible budget and 
to focus on the quality of spending, if 
necessary through more conditionality in 
granting funds; 
• the need to keep an open mind when discussing 
resources and to achieve a more transparent 
way of financing the EU – thus also bringing an 
end to the discussion about (and between) net 
beneficiaries and net contributors; 
• finally, the need to continue the dialogue and, 
in particular, to involve national Parliaments 
more systematically. 
Indeed, the conference constituted a milestone – 
and a remarkable precedent – in this respect: 
members of national Parliaments from across the 
EU could discuss directly with their colleagues 
from the European Parliament and with 
representatives of the Council. Considering the 
changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty – on the 
role of national Parliaments, on the one hand, and 
on the responsibility of the European Parliament 
in the adoption of the MFF, on the other – the 
event provided an ideal platform for informal 
talks and exchanges of views on both the form 
and the substance of the inter-institutional 
negotiations over the 2014-2020 MFF. 
It ended with convergence of views on many issues 
and showed the necessity to continue a broad 
dialogue on the basis of the Commission 
proposals. Many participants did not conceal their 
surprise about the consensual way the discussion 
unfolded and the large areas of convergence 
identified on the occasion. Participants, therefore, 
welcomed the announcement by the forthcoming 
Danish EU Presidency that a similar conference 
will be held in the next semester.  
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Gouvernement économique européen: la 
question n’est plus quand mais comment 
This paper makes the case for strengthened Euro-
pean economic governance. The ongoing debt cri-
sis inevitably impinges national sovereignty and 
should have national leaders come to terms with 
the necessity of sharing more sovereignty. Beyond 
the short-term answers to the risk of a banking 
crisis, it is still not clear how the “economic go-
vernment of the Eurozone” should be shaped. Ac-
cording to the author, letting the Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary affairs chair Ecofin mee-
tings and represent the EU in international institu-
tions would represent both a sensible and feasible 
improvement. Two risks are rightly pointed out: 
the absence of democratic accountability, which 
requires involving national parliaments better at 
European level; and the lack of autonomous finan-
cial firepower, which could undermine the credibi-
lity of such central authority. 
h t t p : / / w w w . r o b e r t - s c h u m a n . e u / d o c /
questions_europe/qe-216-fr.pdf 
The Case against Austerity Today 
Although they are far from insolvent, Eurozone’s 
governments are subject to self-fulfilling prophe-
cies against their ability to pay back their debt. 
With no lender of last resort, they risk falling 
short of liquidity much more quickly than other 
countries. For instance, Spain’s debt level is much 
lower than that of the UK or the USA, and yet 
Madrid pays a much higher premium for it. 
Consequently, this paper argues that Eurozone 
leaders should consider reviewing the mandate of 
the ECB. Macroeconomic analysis suggests that 
debts are crucially needed to sustain growth today, 
and that their reduction should be gradual and 
context-sensitive. Only in good times should go-
vernments be forced to reduce their spending. 
Advocating austerity today might reflect a value-
driven agenda aiming at reducing the state’s size 
and role in markets. 
http://www.ippr.org/publications/55/8033/the-case-
against-austerity-today 
The Rise of the Micro-Multinational: How 
freelancers and technology-savvy start-ups 
are driving growth, jobs and innovation 
This forceful and hard-hitting policy brief analyses 
the deep-seated changes afoot in our economy. 
Currently, big companies are looking to compete 
mostly by downsizing at home or adding jobs in 
emerging markets while cash-strapped govern-
ments have put a break on hiring. By contrast, the 
only entities creating jobs in advanced economies 
are entrepreneurs, young companies and freelan-
cers, many of whom have generated jobs for 
themselves amid slow employment growth and an 
anaemic economic recovery. The policy brief pre-
sents a nine-point set of recommendations for 
policymakers to create jobs and lay a foundation 
for future prosperity in Europe and North Ameri-
ca. 
http://www. lisboncouncil .net/publicat ion/
publication/67-the-rise-of-the-micro-multinational-how-
freelancers-and-technology-savvy-start-ups-are-driving-
growth-jobs-and-innovation.html 
Rethinking Industrial Policy 
Industrial policy has been negatively perceived by 
academia and policy advisers alike. This paper ar-
gues that three significant factors ask for a rethink 
of this issue. First, climate change: without govern-
ment intervention to jump-start massive private 
investment in clean technologies, governments by 
default encourage investment in dirtier technolo-
gies. Second, a new post-crisis realism: laissez-faire 
complacency by many governments has led to mis-
investment in the non-tradable sector at the ex-
pense of growth-rich tradables. Third, China and 
other emerging economies are big deployers of 
growth-enhancing sectoral policies. The challenge 
for Europe is how to design and govern sectoral 
policies that are competition-friendly and thus 
growth-enhancing. Although the EC recognises 
the importance of a sectoral focus (e.g. when defi-
ning its innovation strategy), the paper calls for 
stronger support for this instrument. 
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-
detail/publication/566-rethinking-industrial-policy/ 
4 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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Can EU Strategic Partnerships Deepen Mul-
tilateralism? 
This paper critically examines the objective of 
EU strategic partnerships to promote “effective 
multilateralism”. For a decade, the EU has bet 
on strengthened bilateral relations with emerging 
countries/regions aiming to embed them firmly 
in a rule-based international order. This overar-
ching objective is compromised by inconsisten-
cies, such as larger member states still acting uni-
laterally and even being unable to agree at EU 
level on the UN reform. Emerging powers often 
use multilateral channels towards unilateral asser-
tive ends. A change of method is thus required 
for strategic partnerships: enhanced focus on 
bilateral relations and mutual understanding in 
the short term; and then building ad hoc coali-
tions on such controversial issues as trade, global 
peace and climate change. Only in the long term 
can the EU hope to see its partners come closer 
to its multilateralist reflex. 
http://www.fride.org/publication/943/can-eu-
strategic-partnerships-deepen-multilateralism? 
Baltic Sea, Danube and Macro-regional Stra-
tegies: A model for transnational cooperation 
in the EU? 
This comprehensive study is a first attempt to as-
sess the relevance of macro-regional strategies, 
such as the Baltic Sea and Danube Region strate-
gies launched in 2009 and 2010 respectively. 
These developments must be linked to the new 
Lisbon Treaty objective of territorial cohesion. 
They consist of functional cooperation networks, 
which intend to overcome national and adminis-
trative boundaries and to streamline EU funds 
along common objectives. While other macro-
regions (e.g. the North Sea and the Alps) are fore-
seen, the author calls for caution in drawing any 
general conclusions from the current experiences. 
Although these two strategies have had a smooth 
operational start, member states and regional lea-
ders are yet to be convinced by their added value, 
especially in the light of existing frameworks eligi-
ble for EU funds. 
http://www.notre-europe.eu/en/axes/competition-
cooperation-solidarity/works/publication/baltic-sea-
danube-and-macro-regional-strategies-a-model-for-
transnational-cooperation-in-the-eu/ 
Has Europe given up on Fighting Climate 
Change? 
While coping with the Eurozone crisis and the 
economic downturn, the EU has had no time left 
to meet the climate challenge. If Europeans want 
to avoid an uncontrolled rise in average world 
temperatures beyond the consensual 2 degrees, 
they urgently need to raise their profile and en-
gage with other big players. For political reasons, 
no unilateral move can be expected from the 
USA. Likewise, emerging powers still refuse to 
commit to binding emissions targets. Only 
Europe can show the way since the majority of its 
citizens remain concerned about the risks associ-
ated with climate change. European leaders 
should act more decisively to live up to the 
Europe 2020 objectives. Investments in the field 
of energy efficiency and renewable energy should 
be streamlined and given more substantial sup-
port in the EU budget. 
http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-
article/2011/has-europe-given-fighting-climate-change 
The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2011 
review 
The outcomes of the Ivorian, Libyan and Syrian 
crises at the UN revealed a mixed balance sheet 
for the EU. It succeeded twice in winning the 
support or the constructive abstention of non-
Western powers in 2011, but Syria marked the 
return to bloc politics between a united Western 
front and non-Western powers. The authors the-
refore see the UN as an “institution in flux”, in 
which coalitions are more difficult to predict. 
This means potentially larger room for manoeu-
vre for the EU. Yet, a split on Libya and regular 
divisions over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 
the Human Rights Council have undermined EU 
credibility. European diplomats should be en-
couraged to strive for greater convergence after 
their collective achievement in early 2011, name-
ly obtaining an enhanced observer status for the 
EU. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e c f r . e u / p a g e / - /
ECFR39_UN_UPDATE_2011_MEMO_AW.pdf 
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Arrivées 
Le 10 octobre, deux stagiaires ont rejoint le 
BEPA pour une période de cinq mois: Jan-David 
Blaese, diplômé d’un master d’études 
européennes au Zentrum für Europäische 
Integrationsforschung de Bonn et Renaud 
Thillaye, titulaire d’un diplôme de Sciences-Po 
Paris et d’un master de politique européenne à la 
LSE. Le BEPA leurs souhaite la bienvenue. 
Evénements 
Le 3 octobre, le BEPA a organisé en 
collaboration avec l’IFRI un séminaire consacré 
à l’implication de la société civile dans le 
processus de transition au sein des pays du Sud 
méditerranéen. Des intervenants marocains, 
tunisiens, égyptiens et, bien évidemment, 
européens ont donné leur vision sur la 
contribution de l’Union européenne. Les actes 
du séminaire seront disponibles en ligne 
prochainement: http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/
expertise/conferences/index_en.htm 
Le 5 octobre, le BEPA a organisé un dîner entre 
le Président Barroso et Mme Shirin Ebadi, prix 
Nobel de la Paix 2003. En présence de la Vice-
Présidente Reding et des conseillers de haut 
niveau du Président Barroso, cette rencontre a 
donné lieu à un échange informel sur l’actualité 
des politiques européennes, au regard de la 
question des droits de l’homme, du “printemps 
arabe” et du rôle des femmes. 
Le 6 octobre, le BEPA a organisé, dans le cadre 
de la présidence polonaise, une conférence sur 
les sources de la croissance en Europe. Sur la 
base des rapports de la présidence polonaise et 
de la Banque mondiale consacrés à la croissance, 
économistes, banquiers, universitaires, hommes 
politiques et hauts fonctionnaires ont participé 
au débat. La discussion peut être visionnée en 
streaming : http://scic.ec.europa.eu/str/
i n d e x . p h p ?
sessionno=b628386c9b92481fab68fbf284bd6a64 
Le 7 octobre, le Président Barroso a inauguré les 
nouveaux locaux de la Fondation Jean Monnet 
de Lausanne. A cette occasion, il a remis la 
médaille d’or de la Fondation à Emilio Colombo, 
ancien président du Parlement européen, ainsi 
qu’à Javier Solana, ancien Haut-Représentant de 
l’Union pour la PESC. Suite au discours 
prononcé par le Président Barroso, un échange 
avec les étudiants a également eu lieu. 
Les 20 et 21 octobre, le BEPA a coordonné 
l’organisation d’une conférence sur le cadre 
financier pluriannuel pour l’UE 2014-2020. Cette 
manifestation, ouverte par le Président Barroso, 
le Président Buzek et le Premier Ministre 
polonais Tusk, a permis des échanges 
substantiels avec un grand nombre de 
parlementaires nationaux sur les enjeux du 
prochain cadre financier pluriannuel. 
Activités à venir 
Le 8 novembre, le BEPA organise une rencontre 
entre le Président Barroso et une douzaine 
d’acteurs du monde culturel, venus de toutes les 
régions de l’Union. Ce sera l’occasion d’échanger 
sur les perspectives financières de l’Union et leur 
impact dans le domaine des arts et du spectacle. 
Les 15 et 16 novembre, le Groupe Européen 
d’Ethique (EGE) se réunira afin de finaliser son 
Avis sur les implications éthiques sur les technologies de 
l’information et de la communication demandé par le 
Président Barroso le 22 mars 2011.  
Les 21 et 22 novembre se tiendra au Palais 
d’Egmont la conférence de présentation du 
rapport “Global Trends 2030” rédigé dans le 
cadre du projet ESPAS (European Strategy and 
Policy Analysis System). Le BEPA coordonne la 
Task Force inter-institutionnelle chargée de 
suivre ce projet-pilote confié à l’Institut d’études 
de sécurité de l’UE 
Le 30 novembre, le BEPA organise la rencontre 
annuelle avec les organisations philosophiques et 
non-confessionnelles, conviés par le Président 
Barroso et en présence des Présidents Van 
Rompuy et Buzek. Les discussions porteront sur 
les perspectives en matière de droits de l’homme, 
de démocratie et de liberté confessionnelle dans 
la région méridionale. 
Publications 
Ioannides, Isabelle et Schinas, Margaritis, BEPA 
Policy Brief: The Renewed European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Working with Partners. Brussels: European 
Commission, 30 September 2011. Disponible en 
ligne : http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/index_en.htm 
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